First-mover advantage reversals under passive cross forward ownership in vertically related markets
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Cites work
- Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
- On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
- Price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium
- The welfare effects of vertical integration in multichannel television markets
Cited in
(5)- On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership
- First mover advantage by product proliferation in multiproduct duopoly
- Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal in a vertical structure with cross ownership
- Coordination through committees and markets with option timing games
- Cross-ownership in duopoly: are there any incentives to divest?
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