Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games
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Publication:6160145
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.001zbMath1519.91062MaRDI QIDQ6160145
Iwan Bos, Dries Vermeulen, Niloofar Yousefimanesh
Publication date: 23 June 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
Cites Work
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