Product differentiation in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
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Publication:1815199
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0080zbMATH Open0859.90060OpenAlexW2031265807MaRDI QIDQ1815199FDOQ1815199
Publication date: 25 March 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0080
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Cited In (14)
- Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games
- Two is not too many for monopoly
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price-quantity games
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with substantial horizontal product differentiation
- Experimentation and learning in a differentiated-products duopoly
- Equilibrium existence with spillover demand
- Vertical product differentiation can imply the Friedman-Savage utility function
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Endogenous price leadership
- First mover advantage by product proliferation in multiproduct duopoly
- Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games
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