Error cascades in observational learning: an experiment on the Chinos game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.003zbMath1236.91046MaRDI QIDQ719882

Fernando Vega-Redondo, Francesco Feri, Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, Giovanni Ponti

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/8085

zbMATH Keywords

error cascades; positional learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A90: Experimental studies

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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