Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
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Publication:1763201
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00225-4zbMATH Open1080.91029MaRDI QIDQ1763201FDOQ1763201
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- Finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information
- Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
- On the convergence of informational cascades
- Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
- Learning from others: A welfare analysis
- Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches
Cited In (18)
- Biased social learning
- Path-dependent behavior and information leakage in financial markets
- LEARNING DYNAMICS AND ENDOGENOUS CURRENCY CRISES
- Investment dynamics with common and private values
- Learning about analysts
- Herding and bank runs
- Relative risk aversion and the transmission of financial crises
- Herding with costly information
- Error cascades in observational learning: an experiment on the Chinos game
- The time cost of information in financial markets
- Strategic investment evaluation
- On the role of responsiveness in rational herds
- Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
- Ambiguity and informativeness of (non-)trading
- Informational cascades with endogenous prices: the role of risk aversion
- Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades?
- Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
- Information revelation through bunching
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