Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
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Publication:4949577
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(30)- Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage
- Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt
- Real option value and poverty trap
- Financial fragility, sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs
- Present-biased government and sovereign debt dynamics
- Discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with endogenous sovereign risk
- Banks and liquidity crises in emerging market economies
- Monetary independence and rollover crises
- On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment.
- General equilibrium, preferences and financial institutions after the crisis
- Critical debt and debt dynamics.
- On the relevance of floating exchange rate policies
- Household debt and crises of confidence
- Equilibrium and government commitment
- Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
- A continuous-time model of sovereign debt
- Public debt and fiscal policy traps
- Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation
- Disastrous Defaults
- Risk management for sustainable sovereign debt financing
- Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention
- A contraction for sovereign debt models
- Sovereign default: the role of expectations
- Credit rating and debt crises
- Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications
- Gambling for redemption and self-fulfilling debt crises
- Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
- On the sovereign debt paradox
- Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation
- The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis
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