Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0981-4MaRDI QIDQ680950zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marcia Leon, Aloisio Araujo, Rafael Santos

Publication date 29 January 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0981-4

zbMATH Keywords

leveragespeculative attacksdebt crisispartial default

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Inflation targeting with imperfect information
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
• Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation

Cited in

(5)

• Capital flow freezes
• Sovereign default, debt restructuring, and recovery rates: was the Argentinean ``haircut excessive?
• Financial maintenance covenants in bank loans
• Haircuts, interest rates, and credit cycles
• Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises

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