Sovereign borrowing, financial assistance, and debt repudiation

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0945-0MaRDI QIDQ680963zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florian Kirsch, Ronald Rühmkorf

Publication date 29 January 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74636

zbMATH Keywords

sovereign debtbailoutself-fulfilling runssovereign default

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Crony capitalism and sovereign default
• Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
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Cites work

• A general equilibrium model of sovereign default and business cycles
• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises

Cited in

(8)

• IMF's assistance: Devil's kiss or guardian angel?
• Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model
• The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk
• Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications
• Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
• Crony capitalism and sovereign default
• Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
• Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

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