On the sovereign debt paradox
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Publication:680965
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0971-6zbMATH Open1398.91447OpenAlexW2277564855MaRDI QIDQ680965FDOQ680965
Authors: V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis
Publication date: 29 January 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/118296/13/118296.pdf
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Cites Work
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt
- International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
- Endogenous credit limits with small default costs
- Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt
- Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
- Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
- Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
- A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles
- Default and efficient debt markets.
- Solving the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle with financial frictions
Cited In (7)
- On recursive utilities with non-affine aggregator and conditional certainty equivalent
- Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties
- Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations
- Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops
- Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
- Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks: a normative approach
- Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
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