Inflation targeting with imperfect information

DOI10.1111/IERE.12155MaRDI QIDQ2802718zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tiago Berriel, Aloisio Araujo, Rafael Santos

Publication date 27 April 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12155

zbMATH Keywords

central bank loss functionimperfect informationinflation targeting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(13)

• Re-evaluating the effectiveness of inflation targeting
• Inflation targeting as a coordination device
• Inflation-targeting, price-path targeting and indeterminacy
• Global stability of inflation target policies with adaptive agents
• LEARNING THE INFLATION TARGET
• What kind of central bank competence?
• Managing expectations: instruments versus targets
• Instrument-based versus target-based rules
• Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications
• Information structure and the transmission of inflationary expectations
• Performance of inflation targeting based on constant interest rate projections
• Optimal commitment policy under noisy information
• Robust inflation-forecast-based rules to shield against indeterminacy

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