Inflation targeting with imperfect information

DOI10.1111/IERE.12155MaRDI QIDQ2802718zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tiago Berriel, Aloisio Araujo, Rafael Santos

Publication date 27 April 2016

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12155

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect informationinflation targetingcentral bank loss function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• SIGNALING AND COMMITMENT: MONETARY VERSUS INFLATION TARGETING
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Cited in

(13)

• Performance of inflation targeting based on constant interest rate projections
• Optimal commitment policy under noisy information
• Managing expectations: instruments versus targets
• LEARNING THE INFLATION TARGET
• What kind of central bank competence?
• Robust inflation-forecast-based rules to shield against indeterminacy
• Instrument-based versus target-based rules
• Global stability of inflation target policies with adaptive agents
• Re-evaluating the effectiveness of inflation targeting
• Inflation targeting as a coordination device
• Inflation-targeting, price-path targeting and indeterminacy
• Information structure and the transmission of inflationary expectations
• Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications

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