Optimal commitment policy under noisy information

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2004.07.009zbMATH Open1198.91142OpenAlexW3121947510MaRDI QIDQ956491FDOQ956491

Authors: Kosuke Aoki 

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2004.07.009

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zbMATH Keywords

commitmentnoisy informationoptimal monetary policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (7)

• Reflections on the failure of the Taylor principle under commitment
• The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
• Inflation targeting with imperfect information
• Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target
• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information
• Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication
• The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information

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