Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2008.11.002MaRDI QIDQ2271685zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Niklas J. Westelius

Publication date 7 August 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2008.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

Kalman filterlearningtransparencyNew Keynesian Phillips curvediscretionary monetary policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Filtering in stochastic control theory (93E11)

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Cites work

• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information
• Optimal commitment policy under noisy information
• Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy

Cited in

(6)

• Fiscal-monetary interactions: the effect of fiscal restraint and public monitoring on central bank credibility
• Static and dynamic effects of central bank transparency
• Productivity growth, transparency, and monetary policy
• Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information
• Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty
• Is central bank news good news for loan interest rates volatility?

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