Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00039-3MaRDI QIDQ951485zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars E. O. Svensson, Michael Woodford

Publication date 24 October 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(03)00039-3

zbMATH Keywords

Kalman filtercommitmentpartial informationmonetary policycertainty equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 437299 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3492382 (Why is no real title available?)
• Equilibrium with signal extraction from endogenous variables
• Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information

Cited in

(10)

• Optimal commitment policy under noisy information
• Inferring monetary policy objectives with a partially observed state
• Distortionary taxes and public investment when government promises are not enforceable
• Uncertain potential output: Implications for monetary policy
• Invertible and non-invertible information sets in linear rational expectations models
• Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information
• Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target
• Measurement errors and monetary policy: then and now
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• Uncertainties surrounding natural rate estimates in the G7

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