Financial fragility, sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs
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Publication:1994565
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.03.011zbMATH Open1402.91519OpenAlexW2566485820MaRDI QIDQ1994565FDOQ1994565
Authors: C. G. F. van der Kwaak, S. J. G. van Wijnbergen
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2141110/154380_FinFrag_SovDebt_Bailouts_JEDC_1_.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- The role of financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission
- GOVERNMENT DEBT AND BANKING FRAGILITY: THE SPREADING OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
- An apocalypse foretold: climate shocks and sovereign defaults
- Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises
- The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk
- Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors' pessimism
- International spillovers and bailouts
- Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops
- Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model
- Interbank markets and bank bailout policies amid a sovereign debt crisis
- Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission*
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