Financial fragility, sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.03.011MaRDI QIDQ1994565zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors C. G. F. van der Kwaak, S. J. G. van Wijnbergen

Publication date 1 November 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2141110/154380_FinFrag_SovDebt_Bailouts_JEDC_1_.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fiscal policyfinancial intermediationmacrofinancial fragilitysovereign default risk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises

Cited in

(11)

• The role of financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission
• GOVERNMENT DEBT AND BANKING FRAGILITY: THE SPREADING OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
• An apocalypse foretold: climate shocks and sovereign defaults
• Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial Crises
• The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk
• Sovereign risk, bank funding and investors' pessimism
• International spillovers and bailouts
• Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops
• Interbank markets and bank bailout policies amid a sovereign debt crisis
• Welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model
• Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission*

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