The rationale of in-group favoritism: an experimental test of three explanations
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Publication:2212780
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.09.007zbMath1452.91122OpenAlexW3093314471MaRDI QIDQ2212780
Stefano Papa, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Giuseppe Ciccarone
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.007
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Cites Work
- Testing guilt aversion
- Surprising gifts: theory and laboratory evidence
- Dynamic psychological games
- Discrimination, social identity, and coordination: an experiment
- Promises, expectations \& causation
- The sound of silence: a license to be selfish
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