Guilt aversion in (new) games: does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
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Publication:6188275
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.004zbMath1530.91115OpenAlexW4387096113MaRDI QIDQ6188275
Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie Claire Villeval
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.004
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