Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games.

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0818zbMath1037.91505OpenAlexW1968746483MaRDI QIDQ5954061

Jordi Brandts, Carles Solà

Publication date: 15 October 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0818

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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