Reference points and negative reciprocity in simple sequential games.

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0818zbMath1037.91505MaRDI QIDQ5954061

Jordi Brandts, Carles Solà

Publication date: 15 October 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0818

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

91A90: Experimental studies

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Cites Work

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• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Maximization and the Act of Choice
• Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining