Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.10.016MaRDI QIDQ2016007zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matheus L. C. Menezes, Edward J. P. Cartwright

Publication date 18 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016

zbMATH Keywords

competitionlyingdeceptioncheatingmisreporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites work

• Promises and Partnership
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cited in

(11)

• Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity
• Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
• Gender differences in repeated dishonest behavior: experimental evidence
• Cheating as a dynamic marketing strategy in monopoly, cartel and duopoly
• Posted offers with charitable promises: true preferences and strategic behavior
• ``But everybody's doing it!: a model of peer effects on student cheating
• Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: experimental evidence
• Friendship and in-class academic dishonesty
• Incentives and cheating
• Dishonest behavior: sin big or go home
• Breaking bad: malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game

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