Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.10.016zbMATH Open1290.91028OpenAlexW2027026765MaRDI QIDQ2016007FDOQ2016007

Authors: Matheus L. C. Menezes, Edward J. P. Cartwright 

Publication date: 18 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016

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zbMATH Keywords

competitionlyingdeceptioncheatingmisreporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Promises and Partnership
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cited In (10)

• Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
• Posted offers with charitable promises: true preferences and strategic behavior
• Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: experimental evidence
• Individual cheating in the lab: a new measure and external validity
• Gender differences in repeated dishonest behavior: experimental evidence
• Friendship and in-class academic dishonesty
• Cheating as a dynamic marketing strategy in monopoly, cartel and duopoly
• Dishonest behavior: sin big or go home
• ``But everybody's doing it!: a model of peer effects on student cheating
• Incentives and cheating

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