Breaking bad: malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.09.005MaRDI QIDQ6665673FDOQ6665673

Authors: Rustamdjan Hakimov, Agne Kajackaite 

Publication date: 17 January 2025

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

experimentcontrollyinginstitutionscheatingcrowding-out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• Incentives and cheating
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
• When No Law is Better Than a Good Law*

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