On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1353zbMATH Open1169.91412OpenAlexW2162611071MaRDI QIDQ3394941FDOQ3394941

Authors: Svetlana Andrianova 

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/report/On_corruption_and_institutions_in_decentralized_economies/10090565

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (8)

• Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies
• The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
• Decentralized bribery and market participation
• Decentralisation and the perceived quality of institutions
• Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis
• Rent-seeking under a weak institutional environment
• Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries
• Breaking bad: malfunctioning control institutions erode good behavior in a cheating game

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