Corruption, growth, and increasing returns to production specialization

DOI10.1111/IJET.12067MaRDI QIDQ4584763zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juin-jen Chang, Huei-Chung Lu, Hsueh-Fang Tsai

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12067

zbMATH Keywords

corruption and growthincreasing return to production specialization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cited in

(18)

• On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
• The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development
• Cultural persistence in corruption, economic growth, and the environment
• Education, corruption, and the distribution of income
• Corruption, mortality rates, and development: policies for escaping from the poverty trap
• Corruption, remittances, and public goods: A unified framework
• An optimization approach to the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption
• Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries
• Corruption, inflation and growth
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000127 (Why is no real title available?)
• OPTIMAL GROWTH, DEBT, CORRUPTION, AND R&D
• Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model
• The effect of corruption on capital accumulation
• Corruption and economic growth with non constant labor force growth
• Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
• Corruption and inflation
• Rent-seeking bureaucracies and oversight in a simple growth model
• Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: a theoretical approach

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