Posted offers with charitable promises: true preferences and strategic behavior

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.010MaRDI QIDQ6584602zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Claudia Schwirplies, Andreas Lange

Publication date 8 August 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

bundlingcharitycheatingdonation pledgesexperimentprosocial ultimatum gamepublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Partner selection and the division of surplus: evidence from ultimatum and dictator experiments
• Promises and expectations
• Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment
• Promises, expectations \& causation
• Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions
• Charity as a substitute for reputation: evidence from an online marketplace
• Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• Fairness and Contract Design
• Impure public goods and the comparative statics of environmentally friendly consumption
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Private provision of environmental public goods: household participation in green-electricity programs
• Promises and Partnership

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