Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0044-9zbMATH Open1273.91058OpenAlexW2064233955MaRDI QIDQ367464FDOQ367464

Jacek Miękisz, Michał Ramsza

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0044-9

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zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicssocial normsymmetric ultimatum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• A fixed point theorem for bounded dynamical systems
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games

Cited In (4)

• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game
• An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game
• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game

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