Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0044-9MaRDI QIDQ367464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michał Ramsza, Jacek Miękisz

Publication date 16 September 2013

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0044-9

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicssocial normsymmetric ultimatum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game
• The Social Ultimatum Game
• Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
• Evolution and ultimatum bargaining
• The replicator equation and other game dynamics

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3235051 (Why is no real title available?)
• A fixed point theorem for bounded dynamical systems
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon

Cited in

(5)

• On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games
• Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game
• An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game
• The ultimatum game: discrete vs. continuous offers
• Sampling dynamics of a symmetric ultimatum game

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