Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2000.9990236MaRDI QIDQ4512973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert M. Seymour

Publication date 13 January 2002

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2000.9990236

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsstationary distributionequilibrium selectionevolutionary (ultimatum) game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Learning, matching, and aggregation
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits

Cited in

(1)

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