Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2000.9990236zbMATH Open0976.91003OpenAlexW1977861546MaRDI QIDQ4512973FDOQ4512973

Robert M. Seymour

Publication date: 13 January 2002

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2000.9990236

Recommendations

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054722
• Replicator dynamics of symmetric ultimatum game
• Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5910593

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsstationary distributionequilibrium selectionevolutionary (ultimatum) game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning, matching, and aggregation

Cited In (1)

• Title not available (Why is that?)

This page was built for publication: Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4512973)