Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2000.9990236zbMath0976.91003OpenAlexW1977861546MaRDI QIDQ4512973

Robert M. Seymour

Publication date: 13 January 2002

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2000.9990236

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsequilibrium selectionstationary distributionevolutionary (ultimatum) game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Learning, matching, and aggregation
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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