Stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum game

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2000.9990236MaRDI QIDQ4512973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert M. Seymour

Publication date 13 January 2002

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2000.9990236

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionevolutionary (ultimatum) gamereplicator dynamicsstationary distribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

Starting from a previous working paper dedicated to the dynamics for infinite-dimensional games and based on a pertinent bibliography achieved through the agency of funding from the ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution (ELSE) at the University College London, the author realizes this new and very interesting research paper from the scientific point of view, concerning the stationary distributions of noisy replicator dynamics in the ultimatum game. The paper represents an important transdisciplinary study with many implications and applications.

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Cited in

(1)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5910593 (Why is no real title available?)

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