Control in mutualisms: combined implications of partner choice and bargaining roles

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.023zbMath1414.92218OpenAlexW2118085657WikidataQ85090804 ScholiaQ85090804MaRDI QIDQ1736270

Christopher A. Klausmeier, Antonio J. Golubski

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.09.023

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining gamesmutualismpartner choicecheatercompetition-colonization tradeoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items

Evolutionary stability of one-to-many mutualisms

Cites Work

• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
• The Bargaining Problem