scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1568768
This paper is devoted to the interest in game dynamical equations in the field of game theory. The author formulates a stochastic version of evolutionary game theory, and investigates the effect of fluctuations on the dynamic of social systems. The game dynamical equations describe the average evolution of social systems only for restricted time periods. Consequently a criterium for their validity is developed. In the final part possible extensions to more general behavioral models, and the actual meaning of the game dynamical equations are discussed. A concrete model for the self organization of behavioral convention is also presented. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0952.00071].
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