A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
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Publication:2128620
DOI10.1007/s00245-022-09851-6OpenAlexW4225656912MaRDI QIDQ2128620
Publication date: 22 April 2022
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.14571
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