For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment
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Publication:1018033
DOI10.1007/s00712-008-0029-8zbMath1161.91315MaRDI QIDQ1018033
Ferdinando Colombo, Guido Merzoni
Publication date: 13 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0029-8
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