Continuous time vs. backward induction

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8MaRDI QIDQ672679zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John R. Conlon

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8

zbMATH Keywords

finite time horizonBackwards inductionContinuous timePredatory pricingReputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3599370 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238722 (Why is no real title available?)
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox

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