Signaling quality through price guarantee window for technology-related products

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2023.09.007MaRDI QIDQ6555151FDOQ6555151

Authors: Zhiguo Li, Faqi Xie, Han Zhang, H. W. Zhang 

Publication date: 14 June 2024

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

OR in marketingasymmetric quality informationprice guarantee windowtechnology-related product

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Strategic information management under leakage in a supply chain
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Belief-based refinements in signalling games
• Marketing-driven channel coordination with revenue-sharing contracts under price promotion to end-customers
• Information transparency of business-to-business electronic markets: a game-theoretic analysis
• Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: group buying vs. individual purchasing
• Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain
• Warranty signalling and reputation
• The making of a ``hot product: a signaling explanation of marketers' scarcity strategy
• Intertemporal price discrimination with time-varying valuations

Cited In (1)

• Complexity of a two-stage R\&D game within a cluster supply chain considering vertical R\&D spillovers, effective information, and government subsidies

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