Relational Nash equilibrium and interrelationships among relational and rational equilibrium concepts
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2007.10.029zbMATH Open1140.91326OpenAlexW2081737907MaRDI QIDQ928093FDOQ928093
Authors: Takehiro Inohara 
Publication date: 11 June 2008
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.10.029
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- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Complete stability and inside commonality of perceptions
- Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
Cited In (5)
- Coalition fuzzy stability analysis in the graph model for conflict resolution
- Attitudes and preferences: approaches to representing decision maker desires
- Relational dominant strategy equilibrium as a generalization of dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of a social psychological aspect of decision making
- Deriving Nash equilibria as the supercore for a relational system
- Similarities, differences, and preservation of efficiencies, with application to attitude analysis, within the graph model for conflict resolution
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