THE PEDESTRIAN PRINCIPLE FOR DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198906001211zbMath1274.91074MaRDI QIDQ3444834

Richard H. Stockbridge, Ziyu Zheng

Publication date: 5 June 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; differential game; noncooperative game; dynamic game; stopping game; randomized strategy; mixed strategy; pedestrian principle; rational prediction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)

60H30: Applications of stochastic analysis (to PDEs, etc.)

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