Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00014-9MaRDI QIDQ1408643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco Squintani

Publication date 25 September 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00014-9

zbMATH Keywords

Evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts

Cites work

• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3297399 (Why is no real title available?)
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement

Cited in

(5)

• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt
• Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality

This page was built for publication: Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1408643)