Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00014-9zbMATH Open1057.91051OpenAlexW2145192447MaRDI QIDQ1408643FDOQ1408643

Authors: Francesco Squintani 

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00014-9

Recommendations

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• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts

zbMATH Keywords

Evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents

Cited In (4)

• Renegotiation of long-term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
• Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
• Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt

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