Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1715265
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.027zbMath1406.91045arXiv1804.06984OpenAlexW2797567172WikidataQ88425841 ScholiaQ88425841MaRDI QIDQ1715265
Publication date: 4 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.06984
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (6)
The effect of individual attitude on cooperation in social dilemma ⋮ Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner ⋮ Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game ⋮ Using rewards reasonably: the effects of stratified-rewards in public goods game ⋮ Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games ⋮ Controlling conditional expectations by zero-determinant strategies
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- The Floyd-Warshall algorithm on graphs with negative cycles
- The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point
- Automata, repeated games and noise
- Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
- A selfish origin for recombination
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
- Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
- Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
This page was built for publication: Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
