Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1007/BF01079212zbMath0800.90795OpenAlexW2079263343MaRDI QIDQ1316659

Fernando Vega-Redondo

Publication date: 24 March 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079212

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

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