Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:1316659
DOI10.1007/BF01079212zbMath0800.90795OpenAlexW2079263343MaRDI QIDQ1316659
Publication date: 24 March 1994
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01079212
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