UNIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: SOME INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE THREE-PLAYER EXAMPLE

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003052zbMATH Open1259.91021MaRDI QIDQ3166243FDOQ3166243

Harald Wiese

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueOwen valueunemployment benefitsoutside optionunionizationAumann-Drèze value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study

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