Unions and unemployment benefits: some insights from a simple three-player example

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003052MaRDI QIDQ3166243zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Harald Wiese

Publication date 10 October 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueOwen valueunemployment benefitsoutside optionunionizationAumann-Drèze value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Union games: technological unemployment
• Union membership and employment dynamics: a note
• Individual and Collective Wage Bargaining
• Optimal Unemployment Insurance Policy
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection

Cites work

• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability

Cited in

(2)

• Union games: technological unemployment
• Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory

This page was built for publication: Unions and unemployment benefits: some insights from a simple three-player example

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3166243)