Power measures derived from the sequential query process
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Abstract: We study a basic sequential model for the discovery of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual power in simple games, and show that, as for the Shapley-Shubik index, they extend naturally to measures for TU-games. In particular, the individual measures include all weighted semivalues. We single out the simplest measure in our family for more investigation, as it is new to the literature as far as we know. Although it is very different from the Shapley value, it is closely related in several ways, and is the natural analogue of the Shapley value under a nonstandard, but natural, definition of simple game. We illustrate this new measure by calculating its values on some standard examples.
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