Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids (Q1395144)
From MaRDI portal
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids |
scientific article |
Statements
Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids (English)
0 references
26 June 2003
0 references
The paper provides an axiomatization of the Shapley value in cooperative games in which asymmetries in allowable coalitions is described by restricting the set of possible coalitions to be {antimatroids}. Asymmetries among the players of a cooperative game have been studied in the literature in different ways. In one class of models, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a communication graph. Another type of asymmetry is where the possible coalitions are determined by the positions of players in a hierarchical permission structure. Yet another type of asymmetry is introduced in peer group games in which there are some assumed dependencies among players which is described by a rooted tree. Games on antimatroids includes several such asymmetries as special cases. The paper provides a generalization of axioms given for the permission structures to obtain an axiomatization of the restricted Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids. Some details follow. Let \(( N,v) \) denote a cooperative game with \(N=\{1,\dots,n\}\) denoting a finite set of players and \(v:2^{N}\to R\) denoting a characteristic function on \(N.\) An antimatroid \(\mathcal{A}\) on \(N\) is a subset of \(2^{N}\) satisfying A1. \(\emptyset \in \mathcal{A}\), A2. (accessibility) If \(E\in \mathcal{A}\), \(E\neq \emptyset \) then there exists \(i\in E\) \(E\backslash \{i\}\in \mathcal{A}\), A3. (closed under union) If \(E,F\in \mathcal{A}\) then \(E\cup F\in \mathcal{A}\). The paper confines attention to the case of normality, i.e., A.4. For every \(i\in N\) there exists an \(E\in \mathcal{A}\) s.t. \(i\in E.\) The interior operator \(\text{int}_{\mathcal{A}}: 2^{N}\to \mathcal{A}\) is defined by \(\text{int}_{\mathcal{ A}}( E) =\bigcup _{F\subset E,F\in \mathcal{A}}F\in \mathcal{A}\) for all \(E\subset N\). The restricted game \(v_{\mathcal{A}}\) on \(\mathcal{A}\) is defined by \(v_{\mathcal{A}}( E) =v( \text{int}_{\mathcal{A} }( E) )\). The restricted Shapley value is obtained by applying the Shapley value to the game \(v_{\mathcal{A}}\), i.e., \[ \text{Sh}_{i}( v_{\mathcal{A}}) =\sum_{E\subset N,i\in E}\frac{d_{v_{ \mathcal{A}}}( E) }{| E| } \] where \(d_{v}( E) =\sum_{T\subset E}( -1) ^{| E| -| T| }v( T) \) denotes the dividend of the coalition \(E\) in the game \(v\). The paper shows that the restricted Shapley value on such antimatroid games is characterized by the following six axioms: Axiom 1. (Efficiency) For every cooperative game \(v\) and antimatroid \( \mathcal{A}\) on \(N\), \(\sum_{i\in N} f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}) =v( N.) \) Axiom 2. (Additivity) For every pair of cooperative games \(v,w,f(v+w, \mathcal{A})=f( v,\mathcal{A}) +f( w,\mathcal{A}) .\) Axiom 3. (Necessary player property) For every \(v\) and \(\mathcal{A}\), if \( i\in N\) satisfies \(v( E) =0\) for all \(E\subset N\backslash \{i\}\) then \(f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}) f_{j}( v,\mathcal{A}) \) for all \(j\in N.\) An endpoint or extreme point of \(E\in \mathcal{A}\) is a player \(i\in E\) s.t. \(E\backslash \{i\}\in \mathcal{A}\), i.e. those players who can leave a coalition. A set \(E\) in \(\mathcal{A}\) is called an \(i\)-{path} if it has \(i\) as a single endpoint. Denote the set of { \(i\)-paths} by \(A( i) .\) Player \(i\) is a {null player} if \( v( E) =v( E\backslash \{i\}) \) for all \(E\subset N.\) The {path group} of player \(i,P^{i}\) is the set of players in some \(i\)-path, i.e., \(P^{i}=\bigcup _{E\in A(i)}E.\) Player \(i\) is an {inessential } player if \(i,\) as well as all players \(j\) s.t. \(i\in P^{j},\) are null players. Axiom 4 (Inessential player property) For every \(v\) and \(\mathcal{A}\), if \(i\) is an inessential player then \(f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}) =0.\) The basic path group, \(P_{i}\), of a player \(i\), is the set of players in every \(i\)-path (and so without them \(i\) cannot be in any coalition), i.e., \(P_{i}=\bigcap _{EA( i) }E.\) A monotone cooperative game \(v\) is one satisfying \(v( E) \leq v( F) \) whenever \( E\subset F\subset N.\) Axiom 5. (Structural monotonicity) For any \(v\), \(\mathcal{A}\), if \(v\) is monotone then for all \(i,j\) in \(N\) satisfying \(i\in P_{j}\) we have \( f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}) \leq f_{j}( v,\mathcal{A}) .\) Axiom 6. (Fairness) For any \(v\), \(\mathcal{A}\), if \(E\in \mathcal{A}\) is s.t. \(\mathcal{A}\backslash \{E\}\) is also an antimatroid on \(N\) then \( f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}) -f_{i}( v,\mathcal{A}\backslash \{E\}) =f_{j}( v,\mathcal{A}) -f_{j}( v,\mathcal{A} \backslash \{E\}) \) for all \(i,j\in E.\) Poset antimatroids are the unique antimatroids such that every player has an unique path. Axioms 1 to 5 characterize the Shapley value for this more restricted class of antimatroid games. An application is provided for some auction situations.
0 references
cooperative game
0 references
permission structure
0 references