Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities (Q1753968)

This book presents a survey on partition function form games. It is divided into 4 parts that contain in total 14 chapters. Part I consisting of 3 chapters concerns a general introduction and foundations. In Chapters 1 and 2, the author presents the purpose of the book, and basic terminology and notation, respectively. Chapter 3 introduces preliminaries on different form games and recalls normal and extensive form games, characteristic function form games and partition function form games. Part II of the book consists of 4 chapters and deals with stability. More precisely, in Chapter 4 the author focuses on the concept of dominance, where direct dominance models, coalition formation rules, and farsightedness are discussed. Chapter 5 is devoted to the core and presents various core concepts generalized for games in partition function form. In Chapter 6, the issue of implementation of the core is discussed. The author recalls simultaneous announcement models, alternating offers bargaining model, sequential coalition formation with fixed payoffs division, sequential coalition formation in totally balanced games, and implementation in general partition function form games. Chapter 7 presents other stability concepts like the stable set and the equilibrium binding agreements. Part III with 3 chapters deals with the concept of fairness. In Chapter 8, the author presents different extensions of axioms for characteristic function form games to partition function form games. Chapter 9 is devoted to the Shapley value. The author recalls some modified axioms for partition function games, the generalized Shapley values for partition function form games, the potential approach for partition function form games, as well as implementation and the calculation of the extended Shapley values. In Chapter 10, other values are presented. More precisely, the Banzhaf value, the consensus value, coalition formation values, and externalities in networks are discussed. Part IV contains 4 chapters and focuses on applications. Chapter 11 deals with oligopoly models. Coalition formation in Cournot oligopolies, symmetric Cournot merger system, mergers with antitrust regulation, and mergers in international oligopolies are discussed. In Chapter 12, the author presents some environmental applications, such as international environmental agreements, tragedy of the commons in a fishing lake, straddling stock fisheries, and the issue of sharing a river. Chapter 13 considers femtocell networks. Joint frequency scheduling and interference alignment are recalled. Chapter 14 presents some further applications that concern traffic routing, electrical power transmission networks, matching with externalities, and free trade agreements and customs unions.