Structural stability of coalitions: a formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors

DOI10.3390/g13010017zbMath1484.91084OpenAlexW4210266236MaRDI QIDQ2669177

Herman Monsuur, Réne H. P. Janssen

Publication date: 9 March 2022

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010017

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationnetwork science

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (1)

Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Heuristic decision making in network linking
• Stable network topologies using the notion of covering
• Identifying stable network structures and sets of key players using a \(W\)-covering perspective
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Modelling coalitions: from concept formation to tailoring empirical explanations
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A GENERIC APPROACH TO COALITION FORMATION
• Collective Decision Making
• Centers in Connected Undirected Graphs: An Axiomatic Approach
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

This page was built for publication: Structural stability of coalitions: a formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors