Modelling coalitions: from concept formation to tailoring empirical explanations

DOI10.3390/g11040055zbMath1457.91323OpenAlexW3105571037MaRDI QIDQ2223670

Enzo Lenine

Publication date: 1 February 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g11040055

zbMATH Keywords

coalition theorycoalition modelstaxonomy of models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Structural stability of coalitions: a formal model highlighting the role of participants positioned between members and neutral actors

Cites Work

• Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach
• The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• N‐person games in partition function form
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