A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9530-ZMaRDI QIDQ2629326zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Dominik Karos

Publication date 6 July 2016

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9530-z

zbMATH Keywords

monotonic power indicesparadox of new membersparadox of smaller coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2129302 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
• Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• On the strong monotonicity of power indices
• Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
• Voting power and procedures. Essays in honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Invited papers based on the presentations at the voting power in practice symposium, London, UK, March 20--22, 2011

Cited in

(2)

• Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
• Expected frequency and mean size of the paradox of new members

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