A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members

DOI10.1007/S11238-015-9530-ZzbMATH Open1378.91019OpenAlexW2234068337WikidataQ59475204 ScholiaQ59475204MaRDI QIDQ2629326FDOQ2629326

Authors: Dominik Karos 

Publication date: 6 July 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9530-z

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zbMATH Keywords

monotonic power indicesparadox of new membersparadox of smaller coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
• Voting power and procedures. Essays in honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Invited papers based on the presentations at the voting power in practice symposium, London, UK, March 20--22, 2011
• Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
• On the strong monotonicity of power indices
• A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

Cited In (2)

• Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
• Expected frequency and mean size of the paradox of new members

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