A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
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Publication:2629326
DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9530-zzbMath1378.91019OpenAlexW2234068337WikidataQ59475204 ScholiaQ59475204MaRDI QIDQ2629326
Publication date: 6 July 2016
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9530-z
Cites Work
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- Voting power and procedures. Essays in honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Invited papers based on the presentations at the voting power in practice symposium, London, UK, March 20--22, 2011
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- A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
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