A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2129302 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions
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