A Dynamic Theory for the Class of Games with Nonempty Cores

DOI10.1137/0132026zbMATH Open0354.90099OpenAlexW2013043302MaRDI QIDQ4126098FDOQ4126098

Authors: Lilian Shiao-Yen Wu 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0132026

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cited In (11)

• Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions
• Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study
• U-CYCLES IN n-PERSON TU-GAMES WITH ONLY 1, n - 1 AND n-PERSON PERMISSIBLE COALITIONS
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
• On the \(k\)-accessibility of cores of \textit{TU}-cooperative games
• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
• Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
• The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks

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