Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0368-8zbMath1269.91007MaRDI QIDQ2376074

Javier Arin

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/6373

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicity; cooperative games; core; TU games; Young's theorem; per-capita nucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

Related Items

A monotonic core solution for convex TU games, Consistency, weak fairness, and the Shapley value, Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game, Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution, Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

Cites Work

• Coalitional games: monotonicity and core
• On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions
• A weak monotonicity property of the nucleolus
• Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games
• The Shapley value of exact assignment games
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games.
• The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games
• Core and monotonic allocation methods.
• The aggregate-monotonic core
• Observations on the nucleolus and the central game
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game