River-sharing problem with floods

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.011MaRDI QIDQ7297076zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Takayuki Oishi, Tomoya Tajika

Publication date 15 July 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.03.011

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites work

• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Independence of downstream and upstream benefits in river water allocation problems
• N‐person games in partition function form
• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
• Sharing a polluted river
• Sharing a river among satiable agents
• Sharing a river.
• Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
• Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

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