Reflections on Arrow's research program of social choice theory

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01172-yzbMath1437.91196OpenAlexW2915672264WikidataQ128320053 ScholiaQ128320053MaRDI QIDQ2179462

Kotaro Suzumura

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01172-y

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryArrow's general impossibility theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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