Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

DOI10.1007/BF01262509zbMath0872.90119MaRDI QIDQ1357208

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij

Publication date: 16 June 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-creditor bankruptcy rule; bilateral principle of justice; quasi-transitivity of the binary relations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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