Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems

DOI10.1007/BF01262509zbMath0872.90119OpenAlexW2268532629MaRDI QIDQ1357208

Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij

Publication date: 16 June 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01262509

zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-creditor bankruptcy rulebilateral principle of justicequasi-transitivity of the binary relations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (21)

A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules ⋮ Equal sacrifice taxation ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ The two-agent claims-truncated proportional rule has no consistent extension: a constructive proof ⋮ Consistent cost sharing ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules ⋮ Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims ⋮ A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims ⋮ Allocation rules on networks ⋮ On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach ⋮ On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency ⋮ Flow sharing and bankruptcy games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems ⋮ Allocation problems among sharing groups ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES ⋮ `Hydraulic' rationing ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update ⋮ Parametric rationing methods

Cites Work

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• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Distributive justice in taxation
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• Consistent extensions
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• Stability and Collective Rationality
• On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
• Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions

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