Minimally strategy-proof rank aggregation

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01569-4MaRDI QIDQ6926816zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hayrullah Dindar, Onur Doğan, Lainé, Jean

Publication date 23 September 2025

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-024-01569-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

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• Solidarity and efficiency in preference aggregation: a tale of two rules
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• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria

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