Multiattribute procurement auctions: efficiency and social welfare in theory and practice

DOI10.1287/DECA.2014.0299MaRDI QIDQ4691982zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gregory E. Kersten

Publication date 24 October 2018

Published in Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2014.0299

zbMATH Keywords

bidding-auctionseconomicsefficiencygames/group decisionsmultiattribute utility theory/functionsquasilinear utilityreverse auctionssocial welfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• WELFARE LOSS IN LINEAR PRICE-PREFERENCE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• A multi-attribute e-auction mechanism for procurement: theoretical foundations
• Better, faster, cheaper: an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions
• A multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction with multiple budgets for government vendor selection

Cites work

• A multi-attribute e-auction mechanism for procurement: theoretical foundations
• A multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction with multiple budgets for government vendor selection
• An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process
• Auctions and bidding: a guide for computer scientists
• Auctions, bidding and exchange design
• Better, faster, cheaper: an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback
• Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3616126 (Why is no real title available?)
• Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
• Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• The Judgment Policies of Negotiators and the Structure of Negotiation Problems
• When do market games have transferable utility?

Cited in

(7)

• Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts
• IPV model with Cobb-Douglas and reference-dependent utility functions
• WELFARE LOSS IN LINEAR PRICE-PREFERENCE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
• A multi-attribute reverse auction model on margin bidding
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6452635 (Why is no real title available?)
• Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings
• Are procurement auctions good for society and for buyers?

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