Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function

DOI10.1007/BF01240054zbMATH Open0794.90082OpenAlexW2039636922MaRDI QIDQ687989FDOQ687989

Authors: Masayoshi Mizutani, Yasuhiko Hiraide, Hisakazu Nishino 

Publication date: 31 August 1994

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240054

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zbMATH Keywords

social choiceeffectivity functionstrong cyclepreference order of each playerScarf balancedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60)

Cites Work

• Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Nonmanipulable Cores

Cited In (5)

• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
• Implementation by mediated equilibrium
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• The structure of unstable power mechanisms
• ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING

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